Middle Eastern Countries' Involvement in the Horn of Africa
Zhang Mengying & Li Xinfeng
The Horn of Africa in the northeast of Africa lies along the southern side of the Gulf of Aden, consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Broadly speaking, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda are also considered as part of the Horn of Africa region covering a total population of over 200 million.1 Kidane Mengisteab, The Horn of Africa, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p.9. Separated by the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are along the two sides of the Red Sea. With intertwined historical connections among the regional countries, the Horn of Africa enjoys tremendous strategic importance. In recent years, the Middle Eastern countries of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar have become actively involved in Horn of Africa affairs and had great influence on the geopolitics of the region, generating a possible reconstitution of local security pattern.
New Developments
Owing to their geographical adjacency as well as political and cultural connections, there have been long-existing interactions between Middle Eastern countries and Horn of Africa countries. Since the beginning of the 21st century, major countries of the Middle East have been paying intensive attention to the Horn of Africa. The conflict in Yemen and the diplomatic crisis of Qatar have also triggered relevant nations to strengthen their involvement in Horn of Africa affairs.
Enhancing military presence
Among all the Middle Eastern nations, Iran is the first to pursue military presence in the region. As early as in 2008, Iran signed an agreement on military cooperation with Sudan to support the latter with military equipment. In the same year, Iran sent warships to crack down on Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, Iran and Eritrea reached a deal on deploying the Iranian Navy at the Port of Assab to safeguard the refineries there. In 2011, a small Iranian fleet passed through the Suez Canal, and Iran's submarines began to be deployed in the Red Sea. In 2014, Iran established an anti-piracy formation in the Gulf of Aden. After the conflict in Yemen in 2015, the Saudi coalition signed security treaties with Eritrea and Sudan respectively that denied the berthing of Iranian ships at any ports of the two countries. However, the fleet was preserved.2 Neil Melvin, “The New External Security Politics of the Horn of Africa Region,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No.2019/2, April 2019, pp.9-10, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/sipriinsight1904_1.pdf.
根据水井试验，并对该村水文地质资料进行分析，在该村有前景的靶区布设了2线高密度剖面，图4即为该线高密度剖面反演电阻率断面图。图中可见，测线整体电阻率为30～400Ω·m。在0～20m深度之间，电阻率值较高，大于150Ω·m，推断为干燥的第四系覆盖层。在20m以下深度，电阻率值横向差异较大，大号点和小号点位置电阻率值较大，中间部分250-300号点处存在明显的低阻异常，推断为基岩破碎带，富水性较好。
Turkey is also an early actor seeking to increase military involvement in the Horn of Africa. In 2009, Turkey started to take part in multi-national anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Since then, the Turkish Navy has had regular presence in the waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, as well as the Arabian Sea. In September 2017, a military base built by Turkey and used for training the Somalian armed forces came into service in Mogadishu, with around 200 Turkish troops stationed there. And in December of the same year, Turkish President Recep Erdogan visited Sudan, during which Sudan agreed to grant Turkey a 99-year lease over the Suakin Island to develop it into a tourist destination. According to the agreement, Turkey will construct piers on the island for maintenance of both civil and military vessels. In addition, Turkey has signed an agreement with Djibouti on the construction of a military base.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also sought to enhance their military presence after the conflict in Yemen. In 2015, Eritrea agreed to lease its harbor and airport in Assab to the UAE as military bases for 30 years.3 “Arab Coalition Expands into the Horn of Africa,” http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=36a_1446820766 #3k38s8SbpxAD0BVv.99. In February 2017, the “Republic of Somaliland”4 The “Republic of Somaliland” lies in northwestern Somalia, on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden. The Somali Civil War, which broke out in January 1991, resulted several regimes in the country. In May of the same year, the northern part declared their independence as “Somaliland.” However, it is not recognized internationally. approved the UAE's building of a naval base at the Port of Berbera. In 2015, Saudi Arabia donated five advanced torpedo boats to Djibouti, and several Saudi generals visited Djibouti to discuss the possibility of constructing a military base as well as conducting bilateral military cooperation. At the beginning of 2019, to project greater power in the Horn of Africa, the “Red Sea bloc,” the Saudi Arabia-led military alliance, conducted joint naval exercises along the coastal areas of the Red Sea to enhance their combat capabilities in the region.5 “Saudi Arabia Hopes Naval Exercises in the Red Sea Lead to Greater Clout in East Africa,” Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2019, http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-saudi-arabia-red-sea-20190112-story.html.
一个完善、运行良好的财务管理系统不仅能够帮助企业规避相关的财务风险，提高投资、筹资的效率，更是企业内部审计体系中重要的一个环节。企业财务管理系统和内部审计系统两者相辅相成，具有紧密的协同效应。
Israel, with a naval squad garrisoned in Eritrea since 2012, has also set up a monitoring station to keep an eye on Iran's movements in the Red Sea.
1.2.2 第2年（后茬）玉米试验处理 所有小区都按照前一年化肥处理施肥，即每公顷施氮352.5 kg、磷165 kg、钾 375 kg施肥，保证与前一年等量 N、P、K的施用，保持相同的施肥和管理方式。表2为第2年（后茬）试验处理安排。
Active mediation in regional disputes
Boundary conflicts and territorial disputes among the Horn of Africa nations are extremely complicated, resulting in long-term tensions in the region. Some disputes have even led to military confrontation. By virtue of their influence, Middle Eastern countries have actively mediated in regional disputes. Qatar, once playing an active role in mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea boundary conflict, prompted the two countries to reach a peaceful agreement in 2010. In addition, from 2010 to 2017, Qatari peacekeeping troops were stationed on the Djibouti-Eritrea border. Further, Qatar was also involved in mediating the Darfur War in Sudan as well as the maritime territorial dispute between Somalia and Kenya.
Located right beside the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa is regarded as the strategic periphery of the Middle East. Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan are members of the Arab League, while Ethiopia and Eritrea both have a Muslim majority. As regional chaos such as the “Arab Spring,” Syria Civil War, Yemen conflict and Qatar diplomatic crisis keep changing the political landscape in the Middle East, the power structure of the area continues to fluctuate based on forces led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand and those led by Iran, Turkey, and Qatar on the other. Each side has been pursuing alliances and partnerships in the Horn of Africa region.
The long-existing border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea once provoked a confrontation in 2008. In September 2018, chaired by King Salman of Saudi Arabia, a meeting between President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh and President of Eritrea Isaias Afwerki was held in Jeddah to initiate the normalization of the bilateral relationship. In November, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2444, lifting a series of sanctions on Eritrea to promote the normalization of the Djibouti-Eritrea relationship. UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed his appreciation for the leadership and endeavor contributed by King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman in resolving regional conflicts through dialogues.7 “UN Chief Welcomes Meeting between Leaders of Djibouti and Eritrea,” UN News, September 18, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019642.
In December 2017, hosted by Egypt, representatives of Red Sea coastal nations met in Cairo, where they reached consensus on the fundamental principles for conducting regional cooperation in political, economic and cultural spheres.17 Habib Toumi, “Red Sea Bloc to Thwart Iran Expansionism,” Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/red-sea-bloc-to-thwart-iran-expansionism-1.60920631. Further, the first Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (AARSGA) was held in Riyadh in December 2018. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen agreed to cooperate in setting up a Security Council of the Red Sea, i.e., the “Red Sea bloc.” Cooperation within the bloc would cover an area that ranges from the Horn of Africa and the waters of the Gulf of Aden to Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Regarded as the very first institution of maritime security, as well as a new prototype for regional security alliance in the Middle East, the Red Sea bloc was set up to focus primarily on security coordination among the coastal states, as well as their economic development and environmental protection. No agreement on the alliance mechanism has been reached by the Red Sea Security Council, but Saudi Arabia has suggested an expert group should be assigned to continue related discussions.
Turkey's financial aid has been primarily injected into Somalia. After being heavily hit by drought and famine in 2011, Somalia has begun to receive massive humanitarian assistance worth hundreds of millions dollars from Turkey. These donations have been used to build charity institutions like hospitals and schools and provide humanitarian services, which have been widely recognized by the Somali people.14 Mehmet Özkan, Turkey's Involvement in Somalia: Assessment of a State-Building in Progress, Istanbul: SETA, 2014, pp.23-24. In 2017, Turkey helped the government of Somalia train its soldiers and police, and kept increasing financial aid, investment as well as support for infrastructure development. At the same time, a civil aviation route connecting the two capitals was set up.15 Kamaluddin Sheikh al-Mohammed Arab, “Turkish Military Base in Somalia and Its Impact on Regional Behaviors,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, October 9, 2017, http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2017/10/9/7370824513eb441b97f5eebc4986baf4_100.pdf. In terms of investment, Turkey's priorities in the Horn of Africa region are Djibouti and Sudan. In December 2016, Turkey signed an agreement with Djibouti to build a free trade zone with a planned area of 12 square kilometers and an economic capacity of $1 trillion. Furthermore, as the UN removed sanctions on Sudan in October 2017, Turkey and Sudan reached a cooperation agreement worth $650 million, of which $300 million would be direct investment in Sudan. Turkish President Erdogan has committed to raise the volume of bilateral trade to $10 billion.16 Mustafa Gurbuz, “Turkey’s Challenge to Arab Interests in the Horn of Africa,” Arab Center Washington DC, February 22, 2018, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/turkeys-challenge-to-arab-interests-in-thehorn-of-africa.
In addition, Turkey has also sought to offer its solution to the internal conflict of Somalia. By hosting the Istanbul Conference on Somalia several times since 2010, Turkey has tried to mediate the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and the “Republic of Somaliland.”
Expanding investment and financial aids
Horn of Africa countries are generally undeveloped and short of financial support, which has given Middle Eastern countries space to exert their economic influence. According to a report by the Clingendael Institute, from 2000 to 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait invested around $13 billion in up to 434 projects in the Horn of Africa region. Of this, Saudi Arabia invested about $4.9 billion, and the UAE about $5.1 billion.8 Jos Meester, et al., “Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa,” The Clingendael Institute, April 2018, pp.1-49. As data from the International Monetary Fund shows, the Gulf countries injected around $2.5 billion into Sudan's central bank from 2015 to 2016.9 “Sudan: Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation - Debt Sustainability Analysis,” IMF Country Report, No.17/364, November 13, 2017, p.3. The UAE attaches great importance to the investment and construction of Red Sea coastal harbors. Through a company named DP World, it financed the Port of Djibouti, the Port of Berbera of “Somaliland” and the Port of Bosaso located in northern Somalia successively. In 2006, the Qatar Red Crescent Society set up a health center in Mogadishu to offer medical help for local civilians. In March 2018, Qatar signed a $4-billion deal with Sudan to help develop the Port of Suakin.10 “East Africa Becomes a Testing Ground for UAE and Qatar as They Battle for Influence and Opportunity,” Forbes, April 4, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/04/04/uae-qatarhorn-of-africa-proxy-dispute/#2fbb55ec6ad2. And in January 2019, Qatar also provided the Somalian Army with 68 armored vehicles11 Matt Kennard and Ismail Einashe, “For Somaliland and Djibouti, Will New Friends Bring Benefits?” Foreign Policy, March 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/somaliland-somalia-horn-of-africadjibouti-military-oil-uae-qatar-berbera-port/. and contributed to the infrastructure development including schools and hospitals.
Likewise, Iran and Turkey have increased their financial support and humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa in political, financial, military and medical spheres. From 2000 to 2017, Iran invested $20 million in Ethiopia, the majority of which went to manufacturing and agricultural industries in the Oromia region and the capital city Addis Ababa. In 2011, the Iranian Red Crescent Society went to Mogadishu to offer relief camps for refugees suffering from drought and starvation, and set up portable clinics to provide medical services. Moreover, Iran also gave financial support to Djibouti,12 Iranian Red Crescent, “Actions Taken for the Benefit of Somalia Affected People by IRCS,” January 9, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/actions-taken-benefit-somalia-affected-people-ircs. and the central banks of the two countries agreed to set a credit line for each side's currency.13 “Djibouti Severs Diplomatic Ties with Iran,” The Economist, January 11, 2016, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=453833429&Country=Djibouti&topic=Politics&subtopic=_2.
由图6可知，紫菜的水分含量随着微波时间的增长而降低。在18 min时水分含量最低为3.3%。这是由于堆积厚度、微波功率不变的前提下，微波时间越久，紫菜受热时间越久，水分散发越多，所以水分含量逐渐降低。综合感官评分和水分含量选定微波时间为6，9，12 min作为正交试验的3个水平。
调质效果对于沉性水产饲料水中稳定性的研究也表明了在生产膨化沉性料的过程中，调质效果的关键作用。Eugenio Bortone等[8]对调质时间和机械能输入对膨化虾料水中稳定性带来的影响，进行了实验研究。分别对4组实验(PPC、PPO、LSME和MSME)进行了对比研究，实验结果如图4所示。
新的经济周期机制的税务策划、分析和规划将是一项税，一种缓慢的税收，所有企业在宏观控制、加强企业管理和全面统计，降低产品的成本，提高产品质量，使企业在市场竞争优势的优势。税收策划税收不同，根据法律规定，没有非法的问题。
Attempting to establish regional cooperation mechanisms
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Motivations for Increased Involvement
Based on their own national interests, the Middle Eastern countries involved in Horn of Africa affairs expect to realize their respective strategic objectives, which are different yet share some similarities.
Expanding regional influence
In recent years, by means of both economic and diplomatic approaches, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have zealously invested in the infrastructure construction of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in the meantime, helped ease tensions between the two nations. In the first half of 2018, the UAE officials visited the two countries intensively to accelerate the bilateral reconciliation process. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan visited Ethiopia in June 2018, and the UAE promised to provide US$3 billion to help jump-start Addis Ababa's new relationship with Eritrea.6 “Ethiopia Clears a Vital Path to the Red Sea,” Arab News, July 12, 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1337711. It also promised to speak in favor of lifting the UN's sanctions on Eritrea. In July, the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship, ending the 20-year hostility between the two sides. In August, the UAE declared proposals for constructing oil pipelines connecting Ethiopia and Eritrea. In September, hosted by King Salman of Saudi Arabia, the two leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace agreement in Jeddah.
Iran, as the Shiite leader in the Middle East, has enhanced its relations with the Shia in Iraq, the Bashar regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Palestinian Hamas, and the Houthis of Yemen, with the aim of developing a “Shiite Crescent.” Although the Shia are the minority in the Middle East, Iran expects to expand its strategic sphere by cutting the strength of Arabian countries and therefore enhancing its own power. Thus, Horn of Africa countries were once Iran's diplomatic targets and joined its side successively.
Following its diplomatic crisis in 2017, Qatar, finding itself in a difficult situation, has been actively seeking for help from Arabian countries and the Islamic world, including Horn of Africa countries. On the other hand, major Arabian nations, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, facing the progressive actions by Iran, Turkey, and Qatar in the Horn of Africa region, have responded by utilizing their economic advantages to restructure the political and security landscape of the region.
Since entering the 21st century, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by President Erdogan, has sought to build the national image of a “new Turkey” by implementing the policy of “Opening to Africa.” Therefore, Horn of Africa countries have become a critical component of Turkey's southward strategy as well as the Mediterranean-Red Sea-Indian Ocean Strategic Corridor. At the same time, Turkey also seeks to win the support of Horn of Africa countries for its aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.18 Sun Degang and Zou Zhiqiang, “External Countries Enhancing Military Intervention in East Africa: Situation and Influence,” Contemporary International Relations, No.12, 2018, p.43. Taking advantage of religious and historical connections, Turkey interacts frequently with those Horn of Africa countries having a Muslim majority population. Somalia is considered by Turkey both as a platform to exert its “soft power” as well as an indispensable partner to enhance its regional influence.
The first Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was held in Riyadh on December 12, 2018. Saudi Arabia reached an agreement with six other Arab and African states to establish a new regional security entity to safeguard the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Pursuing military strategic fulcrums
The Horn of Africa lies off the Red Sea coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE regard the Red Sea coastline in the Horn of Africa region as their western security wing. On the other hand, Iran has always desired to deploy naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden so as to surround the Gulf nations. In addition, Turkey has yearned to strengthen its military and strategic influence in the Horn of Africa region and deter the Gulf nations by participating in operations aimed at safeguarding Red Sea waterway safety.
With the conflict in Yemen, the Red Sea coastal ports of the Horn of Africa have achieved greater military strategic importance. After the outbreak of the crisis, the Houthis of Yemen kept defeating the naval forces of the Saudi-led coalition, using advanced coastal defense weapons such as antiship missiles and torpedoes with the support of Iran. As a result, Saudi Arabia was forced to suspend its cargo transportation in the Red Sea in 2018. Considering the domination of western and southern coast of Yemen as a leverage to exert control on Yemen's Civil War, the Saudi-led coalition has deployed major forces in the waters of the Red Sea as well as the Gulf of Aden, primarily in Djibouti, the Assab Port of Eritrea and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, to crack down on Iran and the Houthis. Thus, to support the coalition's military actions in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made use of the Assab Port and its nearby airbases to impose air and sea blockades on Yemen.19 “East Africa Becomes a Testing Ground for UAE and Qatar as They Battle for Influence and Opportunity.”
Safeguarding maritime shipping channel
Middle Eastern countries' involvement has generated dual influence on the peace and development of Horn of Africa countries. From a positive perspective, first, Middle Eastern countries' military assistance and training to Horn of Africa countries help enhance the latter's defense capabilities. Second, they have played an active role in mediating disputes in the region, contributing to the improvement and normalization of regional interstate relations. Third, Middle Eastern countries have also invested heavily in the region's infrastructure construction, which has substantially improved the condition of local infrastructure and economic development. On the other hand, the Middle Eastern nations' provision of the above-mentioned military assistance and security-related construction is mainly aimed at suppressing their opponents, which could essentially bring drawbacks to the region's long-term stability. In addition, the “funds for alliances” policies of these Middle Eastern countries could also jeopardize the independence of Horn of Africa nations, which might even, unfortunately, drag them into the conflicts among Middle Eastern countries.
Achieving commercial benefits
Despite their overall economic backwardness, the market potential of Horn of Africa nations is enormous. In recent years, as the regional security situation turns in a favorable direction with increased stability, the region's economic development potential has begun to appear. Particularly, the ease of tensions among nations of the area and the lifting of sanctions on Sudan and Eritrea by the UN has largely generated the hope for boosting regional economic development, which catalyzes a notably increasing demand for infrastructure construction. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa is also the gate for Middle Eastern countries to reach eastern and central Africa. To expand African markets, the Middle Eastern countries will need to utilize the infrastructure within Horn of Africa countries. By way of example, the trade amount between Turkey and Africa has tripled, reaching up to $17.5 billion since the AKP came to power in 2002. Therefore, port construction is crucial to Turkey's exports to Africa. In addition, for some countries of the Middle East, especially the Gulf countries, the Horn of Africa has a strategic value for food security. In recent times, sovereign funds of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both increased their purchase of agricultural lands in Africa. Thus, regional countries enjoying rich water and land resources, such as Ethiopia, have become the focus of the Gulf countries.23 Zach Vertin, “Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf States Are Playing a Dangerous Game in the Horn of Africa,” Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-africa/2019-01-15/red-sea-rivalries.
Influence of Middle Eastern Involvement
Located between Yemen and Djibouti to the south of the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb strait connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is a crucial passage for trade among Europe, Asia and Africa. An estimated 4.8 million barrels of crude oil and refined oil products, accounting for 4% of the world's total oil supply, pass through here every day according to the US Energy Information Administration.20 Marco Malvestuto, “The Red Sea Route, A Strategic Junction,” May 11, 2018, https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/topics/red-sea-route-strategic-junction.shtml. There are more than 20,000 ships passing through the Gulf of Aden waters in a year, 20% of which are commercial ships. The uniqueness in terms of geographical location makes the Horn of Africa closely connected to the oil lifeblood of the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, the safety and stability of the Horn of Africa not only affects the oil exports of the Middle East but also matters to a secure environment for international navigation in the Red Sea. The World Bank has estimated that between 2008 and 2012, the global economy suffered an annual loss of $18 billion due to Somali piracy.21 Afyare Elmi and Said Mohamed, “The Role of the GCC Countries in Ending Piracy in the Horn of Africa,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2016, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/The_Role_of_the_GCC_Countries_in_Ending_Piracy_in_the_Horn_of_Africa.aspx. For the above reasons, the Middle Eastern nations have endeavored to guarantee secure and unimpeded maritime trade routes by increasing their presence in the Horn of Africa. According to a January 2019 report by the Brookings Institution, the UAE has gained varying degrees of access to at least eight ports or bases along the Red Sea.22 Elana DeLozier, “Seeing Red: Trade and Threats Shaping Gulf-Horn Relations,” The Washington Institute, February 15, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/seeing-red-tradeand-threats-shaping-gulf-horn-relations.
Intensifying risk of militarization
The geographic position and complicated relationships among regional countries have made the Horn of Africa a focus that external powers strive for. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, the United Kingdom and France established military bases in this region, with the United States and Germany joining the competition in early 21st century. In 2018, when piracy off the coast of Somalia was on the rise, several nations performed naval escorts in the Gulf of Aden area. In recent years, although the threat of piracy has substantially eased, the escort operations have not completely stopped with only a few countries adjusting the frequency of their missions to a periodical basis. In fact, the involvement of Middle Eastern countries in the Horn of Africa has clear military considerations.24 Umer Karim, “How Turkey and UAE’s Involvement in the Horn of Africa Is Changing the Region,” December 11, 2017, https://eaworldview.com/2017/12/turkey-uae-involvement-horn-africa-changingregion. The countries' establishment of military bases or deployment of armed forces has further intensified the risk of militarization in the Horn of Africa and transformed the region into a “maritime laboratory” in which each power already has or seeks to obtain a military foothold.25 Matt Kennard and Ismail Einashe, “For Somaliland and Djibouti, Will New Friends Bring Benefits?”
通过6个月治疗后,研究组总有效率为96.0%,高于对照组的84.0%,差异有统计意义(P<0.05),如表2。
Changing original balance between regional and Middle Eastern countries
Middle Eastern countries have brought a “new Cold War” to the Horn of Africa and compelled regional countries to “take sides,”26 James Jeffrey, “The Horn of Africa and the ‘Middle East Cold War’- A Deadly Game of Chess,” New African, December 19, 2018, https://newafricanmagazine.com/news-analysis/the-horn-a-deadly-game-ofchess-2/ changing the original balance in the region. Instigated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti turned against Iran after the conflict in Yemen. Before then, Eritrea was a close ally of Iran in the region. However, in 2015, it forged a coalition with Saudi Arabia and offered the Port of Assab as a logistics hub for Saudi Arabia's Yemen operations.27 Alex Mello and Michael Knights, “How Eritrea Became a Major UAE Military Base,” Tesfa News, September 2, 2016, https://www.tesfanews.net/west-of-suez-for-the-united-arab-emirates/. Also, Sudan and Iran once enjoyed long-term military cooperation. At the request of Sudan, Iran provided support by training Sudan's intelligence department and helping build its military industry. In return, Sudan granted Iran the permission to produce weapons within its borders. In 2016, however, Sudan, under Saudi pressure, severed diplomatic relations with Iran and dispatched troops to assist Saudi Arabia in Yemen.28 “Troop Deployment to Yemen Offers Economic Benefits,” The Economist, November 20, 2015, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1143686498. Djibouti once agreed to be a trans-shipment port for Iran, providing arms for the Houthis, but likewise, it was forced by Saudi Arabia to terminate its diplomatic ties with Iran in January 2016, and instead allow the Gulf nations to use its airspace and accept refugees from the Yemen conflict.29 “KSRelief Opens Village for Yemeni Refugees in Djibouti,” Arab News, November 2, 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1398146/saudi-arabia. In April 2015, Somalia's Foreign Minister announced that the Saudi coalition was authorized to use its airspace, territorial waters and land to fight against the Houthis in Yemen. In January 2016, Somalia also formally ended diplomatic relations with Iran. Further, at the end of 2018, the “Red Sea bloc” was founded to forge a new platform for Saudi Arabia to expand regional security cooperation and enhance its capability to compete with Iran for the leadership in the Islamic world. Thus, the emergence of the coalition is likely to spread the chaos in the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, and substantially challenge all sorts of efforts made by the African Union to construct a peace and security system on the continent.30 Alex de Waal, “Pax Africana or Middle East Security Alliance in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea?” World Peace Foundation, Occasional Paper No.17, January 2019, pp.13-14.
Another case in point is witnessed in Qatar's diplomatic crisis. While Djibouti and Eritrea switched sides from Qatar to Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Sudan retained their relations with Qatar, which has resulted in retaliation from Saudi Arabia.
Triggering new crises within Horn of Africa countries
Middle Eastern countries' infiltration into the Horn of Africa has triggered new tensions within the region. For instance, external involvement has intensified factional conflicts in Somalia, weakening its development capability. At the beginning of 2017, several Gulf states were accused of intervening in Somalia's domestic affairs through its presidential election. Since the breakout of Qatar's diplomatic crisis, the government of Somalia, which adopted a neutral stance, has faced intense pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The UAE insisted that Somalia was tightly connected to Qatar in this crisis and President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo had been taking funds from Qatar before he was elected.31 “Qatar’s Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, June 5, 2018, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/publications/2018/06/qatars-resilience-modelresisting-blockade-power-small-states-180605095522961.html In addition, several state governments in Somalia also declared support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the crisis and condemned the federal government for taking a neutral position.32 “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” International Crisis Group, June 5, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis. To punish the federal government of Somalia, the UAE has strengthened its relations with the “Republic of Somaliland,” constructing a military base in the Port of Berbera and signing a $442-million agreement to upgrade the port. It has also bypassed the federal government and made contact directly with local state governments, for example, training coast guards in the Puntland area of northern Somalia. It has even sold arms in Somalia and supported its internal terrorist activities.33 Kamaluddin Sheikh al-Mohammed Arab, “Turkish Military Base in Somalia and Its Impact on Regional Behaviors.” A report issued by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2017 indicates that the construction of the Berbera military base is a grave violation of the UN's arms embargo on Somalia.
Another example is the change of Sudan's regime. Sudan was heavily dependent on financial aid from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar to support its sluggish economy. Therefore, Sudan took a nominally neutral stand during the Qatar crisis. Saudi Arabia and the UAE considered the position as a gesture lacking “loyalty” and cut their funds to Sudan,34 “Improving Prospects for a Peaceful Transition in Sudan,” International Crisis Group, January 14, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b143-improving-prospects-peaceful-transitionsudan. which then caused a series of problems in Sudan including the shortage of foreign exchange, currency devaluation and decreasing imports,35 “Sudan: Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation-Debt Sustainability Analysis,” IMF Country Report No.17/364, November 13, 2017, p.19. exacerbating its already weak economy. The situation then aroused people's discontent leading to President Omar al-Bashir being ousted.
Aggravating non-traditional security challenges
Middle Eastern countries' increasing military intervention has spread the power rivalry and internal conflicts in the Middle East to the Horn of Africa, providing local terrorists and extremist organizations with illegal arms, funds and operating space which has led to rising terrorism and the revival of piracy. Since 2015, the continuous conflict in Yemen has generated power vacuums in some areas, providing the Al-Shabaab militant group, hidden in Somalia's mountainous area, with additional development space. As the Global Terrorism Database suggests, there were six terrorist attacks launched by Al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2007, and the number reached up to 558 in 2016. Also, the frequency of cross-border attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab has witnessed rapid growth, making Kenya the biggest victim. Between 2008 and 2016, Kenya suffered 291 cross-border attacks launched by Al-Shabaab. In the past two years, Al-Shabaab has become even more radical, performing several attacks in both Somalia and Kenya. In January 2019, a five-star hotel located in the western district of Nairobi was attacked by Al-Shabaab, leaving 21 people dead and 28 injured. And on the same day, Al-Shabaab attacked Kenyan troops garrisoned in the camp of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), killing more than 100 people.36 “14 Dead, All Terrorists Killed in Nairobi Hotel Complex Attack,” NDTV, January 16, 2019, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/kenya-hotel-attack-president-kenyatta-says-all-nairobi-attackerskilled-1978437. In the Global Peace Index 2018 report, among all 163 global nations and regions investigated, Horn of Africa countries are generally among the least peaceful in the world, with Sudan ranked 153rd, Somalia 159th, and South Sudan 161st.37 Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, June 2018, http://visionofhumanity.org/reports. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 report also indicates that Somalia and Kenya are more likely to experience terrorist attacks.38 Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, November 2018, http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.
During the first decade of the 21st century, Somali pirates were once rampant in the Gulf of Aden, threatening the security of ships and people passing by. Due to joint efforts made by the international community, great achievements have been made in escort missions. There was not a single ship or person hijacked by pirates by October in 2016. However, the year 2017 saw the re-emergence of piracy in Somali waters. In March 2017, a ship fully loaded with crude oil heading for Mogadishu from Djibouti was hijacked off the Somali coast. As the International Maritime Bureau's 2018 Piracy Report indicates, although there were no hijack incidents in Somali waters in 2018, some oil tankers and freighters were attacked by pirates from time to time.39 “IMB Piracy Report 2018: Attacks Multiply in the Gulf of Guinea,” International Chamber of Commerce - Commercial Crime Services, https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1259-imb-piracy-report-2018-attacks-multiply-in-the-gulf-of-guinea. The re-emergence of Somali pirates demonstrates the security risks of Somali waters, which is also a spillover effect resulting from the Saudi coalition's military intervention in this region.40 “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in East Africa 2017,” Oceans beyond Piracy, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop/east-africa. As Iran accused, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Yemen had been secretly providing funds and arms to Somali pirates.41 Anthony Chibarirwe, “Pirates from Somalia are Taking Advantage of a Diminishing International Security Presence in the Region,” The Trumpet, May 19, 2017, https://www.thetrumpet.com/15814-somalipirates-are-back.
Conclusion
Active intervention conducted by confronting blocs suggests that the Middle East has gradually become a crucial player in Horn of Africa affairs. However, the Middle Eastern countries are most concerned about their own strategic interests, and do not prioritize the benefits of Horn of Africa countries, let alone formulating strategic plans for the region's security and development. This means the essential roots of the frequent conflicts and spread of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, namely poverty and socio-economic inequality, have not been addressed through their invention. Therefore, Horn of Africa countries should rely on themselves to resolve their security and development dilemma through promoting socio-economic development, enhancing their independent peacekeeping capabilities, and improving people's living standards.
冷存储有较低的访问频率和随时可访问的特性。虽随时可访问，但访问速度有所降低，服务级别有所降低。访问冷数据响应时间大约在5-10s，由于访问的都是历史数据，对实时性要求不高，对铁路视频监控系统使用者来说这是在可以接受范围之内，因此采用冷存储技术将大大节省铁路视频应用成本。冷存储具有以下几个优点：
Zhang Mengying is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Li Xinfeng is Research Fellow at the Institute of West Asian and African Studies, CASS.
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